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In recent years, as both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) have stepped up their enforcement efforts,
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has been the subject of harsh
criticism. Although critics have identified a variety offlaws in both the law and
its enforcement, no one has seriously questioned a basic policy choice: why an
agency whose mission is to protect investors is charged with civil enforcement
of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. Congress conferred this authority on
the SEC in 1977 despite the SEC's statements that it did not fit within its
mission. For over twenty years, the SEC brought few actions involving
allegations of foreign bribery and supported congressional efforts to
consolidate enforcement in DOJ. By contrast, the SEC began to enforce the
FCPA in the early 2000s with increasing enthusiasm. It has set up a
specialized unit and publicized its large settlements, without ever providing an
explanation of how enforcing the foreign bribery provision relates to the SEC's
mission "to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation. "
I first review the legislative history, the "quiet" years prior to the early 2000s,
and the SEC's aggressive enforcement since then. Next I review academic
literature, first, to see if there is a theory to explain the SEC s behavior and,
second, to explore the problems of multi-goal agencies. My central argument is
that, since combating global corruption is not part of the SEC's mission,
enforcement of the FCPA should be consolidated in DOJ. Finally, in Dodd-
Frank § 1502 (conflict minerals reporting requirement), Congress made the
same mistake: it gave the SEC a power that it does not want and that diverts
scarce resources from its core mission.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) posted on its website an "Investor Bulletin:
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Prohibition of the Payment of Bribes to
Foreign Officials." 1 The bulletin provided a concise description of the statute,
its enforcement and penalties and explained that it was providing this
information "as a service to investors." 2 It did not explain, however, why it
thought this was information that investors would find important or useful. This
bulletin highlights the conundrum of the SEC's enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
The FCPA, enacted in 1977, has two separate and distinct provisions. The
anti-bribery provision prohibits reporting companies from paying bribes to
foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business. 3 The accounting
provisions require reporting companies to maintain accurate books and records
and have a system of adequate internal controls. 4 The SEC and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) share enforcement power; the SEC has the authority to enforce
the provisions civilly, 5 and DOJ has the authority to bring criminal actions.6
Congress gave the SEC civil authority to enforce the statute's anti-bribery
provision despite the SEC's statements that the provision did not fit within its
mission. Although the SEC routinely brings actions to enforce the accounting
provisions, it brought few actions involving allegations of foreign bribes for
1 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Prohibition of the Payment of Bribes to Foreign
Qfficials, INVESTOR.GOV (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-
bulletins/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-prohibition-payment-bribes-foreign-offi.
21d.
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 30A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I(a)
(2006).4 Exchange Act § 13(b)(2)(A) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (B) (2006).
5 Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2006).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006). DOJ also has civil anti-bribery enforcement
authority over domestic concerns subject to the FCPA. Id. § 78ff.
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over twenty years and indeed supported Congressional efforts in the 1980s to
consolidate enforcement of the anti-bribery provision in DOJ. In recent years,
however, the SEC has aggressively enforced the FCPA, including the creation
of a specialized unit devoted to FCPA cases, and has publicized its large
settlements. Yet the SEC has never explained how enforcing the anti-bribery
provision relates to the SEC's mission "to protect investors, maintain, fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."'7
My principal argument is that the SEC should devote its attention to those
activities that are central to its mission, in particular, its mission to protect
investors from securities fraud. The paper proceeds as follows:
Part II describes the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the FCPA
and the "quiet years" before the SEC stepped up its enforcement efforts in the
early 2000s.8 I examine the SEC's own statements about the FCPA and its
support for proposals to consolidate enforcement of the anti-bribery provision in
DOJ. This history makes clear that while the SEC viewed the FCPA's
accounting provisions as central to its campaign to improve corporate
accountability and governance, the SEC demonstrated little interest in enforcing
the anti-bribery provision and never asserted that it was related to the SEC's
mission.
Part III describes the new era of aggressive enforcement beginning in the
early 2000s and intensifying under the terms of SEC Chairmen Christopher Cox
and Mary Schapiro. While the SEC proudly announces its large-dollar amount
FCPA settlements, it has not offered a convincing explanation about how these
enforcement actions relate to its mission.
7 The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http:/
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified July 30, 2012). The SEC frequently
refers to itself as the "investor's advocate" and emphasizes its investor protection mission.
See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to the Council of
Institutional Investors (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spchO4O6O9mls.htm (stating that the SEC is "the only federal agency dedicated to
looking out for investors").
8 Statistics about SEC enforcement actions (both judicial and administrative), unless
attributed to another source, are from a self-constructed database compiled by reviewing
Litigation Releases and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases posted on the SEC
website from 1978 through December 31, 2011, supplemented with Westlaw and Lexis
searches. SEC FCPA ACTIONS DATABASE (on file with author). If an action named multiple
defendants, it was counted as one action; if the SEC simultaneously filed a judicial and an
administrative action against the same defendants, it was counted as two actions. Id. The
SEC FCPA Actions Database includes not only actions where the SEC alleges a § 30A
violation, but also those where the factual allegations refer to foreign bribery, even though
the alleged violations are only the accounting provisions. Id. The SEC itself identifies the
latter as FCPA cases in its press releases. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
SEC Charges Willbros Group and Former Employees with Foreign Bribery (May 14, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-86.htm.
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Part IV first reviews the academic literature that offers theories to explain
agency behavior and finds that it does not provide a convincing explanation for
the SEC's about-face. After reviewing recent literature on multiple-goal
agencies, I argue that the SEC should redirect its energies to its core mission of
investor protection. It is finally time to consolidate enforcement of the FCPA in
DOJ.
Finally, Congress should refrain from tasking the SEC with additional
responsibilities unrelated to its core mission. The history of the FCPA serves as
a cautionary tale. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Congress charged the SEC with promulgating
rules to implement the "conflict minerals" provision that requires reporting
companies to disclose whether they manufacture products using "conflicts
minerals" from the Democratic Republic of Congo or contiguous countries. 9 As
a result, the SEC has already expended countless hours of staff time in drafting
regulations on a politically sensitive issue for which the SEC has no expertise.
II. ENACTMENT OF THE FCPA AND THE "QUIET YEARS"
A. The Enactment of the FCPA
The enactment of the FCPA in 1977 is a testament to the force of Stanley
Sporkin, the SEC's Director of Enforcement at the time. 10 The SEC had only a
few years earlier reorganized the Enforcement Division to centralize most of its
enforcement activity in the D.C. office instead of in the SEC's regional offices,
thus allowing the division, for the first time, to pursue coordinated enforcement
efforts on a national scale. 11 In addition to possessing a larger enforcement
staff, Mr. Sporkin had tremendous energy, an inquiring mind, and training as an
accountant. During the Watergate investigation, officers of major U.S.
corporations testified about corporate political contributions to President
Nixon's re-election campaign. 12 Mr. Sporkin has recalled: "After hearing the
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1386, 2213 (2010).
10 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 540 (3d. ed. 2003) ("No
history of the Securities and Exchange Commission would be complete without noting the
competence and ingenuity of the [SEC]'s Enforcement Division under its second director,
Stanley Sporkin.").
I Daniel M. Hawke, A Brief History of the SEC's Enforcement Program 1934 1981,
SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 25 (Sept. 25, 2002), http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rack
spacecloud.com/collection/papers/2000/2002 0925 enforcementHistory.pdf (stating that the
questionable payments program demonstrated that the SEC could advance a national agenda
in ways not previously possible).12 For a full account, see Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and
Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 16 SEC Docket 1143, 1144 (Feb. 15, 1979) (setting forth
background and enactment of FCPA); and SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 539-48.
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testimony, several accounting questions immediately sprang to my mind. How
did a publicly traded corporation record such an illegal transaction? What, if
any, information did the outside auditors have?" 1 3 He initiated an SEC informal
inquiry that revealed instances of illegal and questionable payments that were
disguised on the corporate books and records. 14 The SEC's informal inquiry
turned into a formal SEC investigation that uncovered evidence of bribes to
officials of foreign governments made by many of the nation's leading
corporations.15 Indeed, because of the volume of cases, the SEC instituted what
subsequently became a standard enforcement tool-a voluntary disclosure
program that required corporations to conduct an independent investigation to
determine the scope of the activity, disclose publicly their improper payments,
and agree to remediation efforts. 16
To the SEC, the issue was the "integrity and reliability of the corporate
books and records"' 7 :
The almost universal characteristic of the cases reviewed to date by the
[SEC] has been the apparent frustration of our system of corporate
accountability which has been designed to assure that there is a proper
accounting of the use of corporate funds and that documents filed with the
[SEC] and circulated to shareholders do not omit or misrepresent material
facts. Millions of dollars of funds have been inaccurately recorded in corporate
books and records to facilitate the making of questionable payments. Such
falsification of records has been known to corporate employees and often to
top management, but often has been concealed from outside auditors and
counsel and outside directors.
Accordingly, the primary thrust of our actions has been to restore the
efficacy of the system of corporate accountability and to encourage the boards
of directors to exercise their authority to deal with the issue.
To this end we have sought independent review of past disclosure in our
enforcement actions and in our voluntary disclosure program; we have
requested the auditing profession to review its procedures and to make
13 Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act on Its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 271 (1998);
see also SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 539-48 (describing the SEC's early questionable
payments investigations).
14 Sporkin, supra note 13, at 271.
15 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 1 57
(1976), reprinted in Special Supplement, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 353 (May 19,
1976) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] (describing the SEC's activities, analyzing public
information that was disclosed as a result of these activities, and discussing responses of the
private sector to the identified problems).
16 SEC REPORT, supra note 15, at 6 12; Sporkin, supra note 13, at 273.
17SEC REPORT, supra note 15, at 3; see also Sporkin, supra note 13, at 274 ("[W]hat
was necessary was a simple law that would require corporations to keep accurate books and
records.").
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suggestions for dealing with the problem and we have asked the New York
Stock Exchange and others to consider helping us strengthen the ability and
resolve of the boards of our major corporations to act independently of
operating management.18
The questionable payments scandal thus marked the beginning of the SEC's
campaign to improve corporate accountability. To that end, the SEC proposed
legislation that would:
1. Prohibit falsification of corporate accounting records;
2. Prohibit the making of false and misleading statements by corporate
agents to auditors; and
3. "[R]equire management to establish and maintain its own system of
internal accounting controls designed to provide reasonable assurances
that corporate transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and that such
transactions as are authorized are properly reflected on the
corporation's books and records in such a manner as to permit the
preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles ...."19
The SEC, however, expressed no views on "whether there should be a
general statutory prohibition against the making of certain kinds of foreign
payments." 20 This was a question beyond the scope of the SEC's authority and
expertise because it "presents a broad issue of national policy with important
implications for international trade and commerce, the appropriateness of
application of United States law to transactions by United States citizens in
foreign countries, and the possible impact of such legislation upon the foreign
relations of the United States." 2 1 Indeed, in written testimony submitted to the
Senate Banking Committee on the proposed legislation, SEC Chairman
Roderick Hills made clear that:
[The SEC] would prefer not to be involved in civil enforcement of [the anti-
bribery] prohibitions since they embody separate and distinct policies from
those underlying the federal securities laws. The securities laws are designed
primarily to insure disclosure to investors of all the relevant facts concerning
corporations which seek to raise their capital from the public at large. The
[anti-bribery] prohibitions .... on the other hand, would impose substantive
18 SEC REPORT, supra note 15, ata b.
191d. at 58-59.20ld. at 61.
2 11d. at 61-62.
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regulation on a particular aspect of corporate behavior.... [T]he enforcement
of such provisions does not easily fit within the [SEC]'s mandate. 22
Despite the SEC's disclaimer, however, Congress determined to give the
SEC the power to bring civil enforcement actions against reporting companies
for violations of § 30A, the anti-bribery provision, as well as violations of
§ 13(b)(2), the books and records and internal controls provisions (collectively,
the "accounting provisions"), in large part because of the SEC's early
leadership on the issue and its development of expertise in foreign
investigations. 23 The Senate Report gave three additional reasons:
1. "If this investigative responsibility were to be assigned solely to the
Justice Department... that agency would have to duplicate the
investigative capability already in the SEC at a greater cost to the
Government."
24
2. "The committee believes this division of responsibility will result in a
stronger enforcement effort compared to an exclusive assignment to the
Justice Department. It is often difficult to assemble the degree of
evidence required in a criminal action, but enough evidence may exist
to enable the SEC to halt a continuation of the corrupt practices through
an injunctive action."25
3. "The committee believes that, by assigning to the SEC enforcement
responsibilities for the new prohibition, it will strengthen the [SEC]'s
ability to enforce compliance with the existing requirements of the
securities laws, and with the new accounting provisions recommended
by the [SEC] .... ,,26
22 Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure:
Hearing on S. 305 Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 124
25 (1977) (statement of Roderick Hills, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n); see also id.
at 111 ("[W]e do not seek nor entirely wish to have the responsibility for stopping these
kinds of payments. Because our role in this area is mostly disclosure... I hope that over the
course of time, the [SEC's] role doesn't change from disclosure to the regulating of
corporate conduct.").
23S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 12 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098. For a
critical contemporary view, see Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and Foreign Bribery, 32
Bus. LAW. 53, 70 (1976) ("The 'improper payments' controversy focuses the spotlight once
more on the almost painful tension between the SEC's view of its proper role in the world-
the protection of investors through the medium of disclosure and the regulation of securities
markets and the pressures on it as the only effective agency in the field to do something
about corporate management.").
24 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11-12 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.
2 51d at 12.
26 1d
2012] 1099
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Congress may also have been concerned that DOJ, as part of the executive
branch, might be less enthusiastic about enforcing the FCPA because of foreign
policy concerns. 27
B. The Corporate Accountability Campaign
SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams2 8 made clear that from the SEC's
standpoint the accounting provisions were far more significant than the anti-
bribery provision. 29 Indeed, the SEC made few public statements about the anti-
bribery provision and expressed little interest in enforcing it. In its first release,
which simply provided a brief description of the FCPA's provisions, it noted
that "[a] number of inquiries have been received by the staff which relate to the
scope of the Act and the applicability of its criminal provisions to specific
factual situations." 30 In response, the SEC stated that it "does not intend to
render interpretive advice on the applicability of the Act's proscriptions to
particular factual situations." 3 1
Instead, the SEC remained focused on corporate accountability. The
accounting provisions were described as "a measure to foster managerial
integrity," 32 because there was "increasing attention to, and interest in, the
effectiveness of internal accounting controls" 33 as a result of the improper
payments scandals. As part of its message of corporate accountability, the SEC
began to emphasize corporate governance and advocated practices-
independent directors and an independent audit committee to exercise oversight
27 See SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 548 (describing efforts made by Ford administration
to remove jurisdiction over questionable payment sanctions from the SEC).
2 8 Harold M. Williams was the SEC Chairman from April 18, 1977 until March 1,
1981. SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last modified Aug. 28,
2012) [hereinafter SEC, Historical Summary].
2 9 Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Foreign Investment in
the United States 20 (June 19, 1979), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1979/
061979williams.pdf; see also Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
The Role of the SEC in Overseeing the Accounting Profession 40-43 (Mar. 13, 1980),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1980/O31380williams.pdf (stating the
accounting provisions were the most important of the FCPA).30 Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Exchange Act Release
No. 14,478, 14 SEC Docket 180, 183 (Feb. 16, 1978).
31Id.
32 Daniel L. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act The Federalization of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1,
4 (1979). Mr. Goelzer was Executive Assistant to SEC Chairman Williams at the time. Id.
at 1.
33 1979 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 30; see also Goelzer, supra note 32, at 6 (describing the
improper payments as "symptoms of weak corporate accountability and governance
mechanisms which transcended the disclosure requirements of the securities laws").
1100 [Vol. 73:5
THE SEC AND THE FCPA
over management and the role of the auditor as an independent gatekeeper 34-
that were not fully achieved until after another era of corporate scandals (Enron,
Worldcom, etc.) that resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.35  Chairman Williams gave numerous speeches on corporate
accountability throughout his tenure.36 He frequently laid out a vision of the
corporate board consisting principally of independent directors and with
independent nominating, compensation, and audit committees, 37 and the
oversight function performed by the auditor. 38
The organized corporate bar, recognizing that the SEC was moving beyond
its traditional focus on disclosure and materiality, 39 reacted with alarm. An
influential ABA committee issued a report describing the accounting provisions
as "the most extensive application of Federal law into internal corporate affairs
since passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts" 40 and the statutory language as
"simplistic and vague." 4 1 The report predicted "at least the possibility that the
new statute will create extensive new liabilities for corporate managements,
34 Goelzer, supra note 32, at 33 (noting that the SEC's General Counsel suggested that
the accounting provisions could be the basis for requiring corporations to have audit
committees and management review of audit controls).
3 5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
36 Other Commissioners also gave numerous speeches on corporate accountability. See,
e.g., John R. Evans, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Audit Committee and the
Internal Auditor: Strengthening Corporate Accountability 4-5 (Nov. 19, 1979), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1979/11l979evans.pdf (addressing confusion about what
the FCPA accounting provisions require of managers, internal auditors, and audit
committees).3 7 Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Corporate
Accountability One Year Later 23, 26-28 (Jan. 18, 1979), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/1979/011879williams.pdf.
3 8 Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Current Problems in
Financial Reporting and Internal Controls 21 (Oct. 9, 1978), available at http:/
www.sec.gov/news/speech/1978/100978williams.pdf; Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, The Accounting Profession: Responses to an Environment of
Change 13 (Jan. 9, 1979), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1979/010979
williams.pdf; Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Accounting
Profession and the Challenges Ahead 11 12 (Jan. 21, 1981), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/01218lwilliams.pdf. He repeatedly stressed the
importance of private initiatives by the profession, although two D.C. corporate attorneys
described Williams as "a sheep dressed in wolfs clothing." SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at
550.
39 Goelzer, supra note 32, at 5.40 Comm. on Corporate Law & Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2)
Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAW. 307, 308
(1978).
41id. at 309.
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auditors, and corporate counsel, and have sweeping though unintended effects
on the working relationships among them."42
In February 1979, the SEC adopted two rules to implement the accounting
provisions.4 3 The adopting release did not alleviate the corporate bar's anxiety.
Although the SEC noted commenters' concerns about the breadth of the rules, it
rejected calls to include materiality and scienter limitations as inconsistent with
the goal of corporate accountability. It also sought to reassure:
[T]hat the concern expressed with respect to inadvertent and inconsequential
errors is unwarranted. The statute does not require perfection but only that
books, records and accounts "in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect
the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer" (emphasis added).
In addition, the legislative history reflects that "standards of reasonableness"
are to be used in applying this provision.
4 4
C. Push Back
By the early 1980s, it was clear that corporate resistance to both the
accounting and the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA had not abated. One
critic noted that "[t]he Senate Banking Committee demanded a strong criminal
statute making bribery punishable by a prison term. The [SEC] demanded
greater authority to regulate accounting and bookkeeping practices. So, in the
spirit of true Washington compromise, a law was produced that combined the
worst of both worlds.,,
45
1. Accounting Provisions
In March 1981, the General Accounting Office (GAO) released the results
of a survey of 250 Fortune 1000 industrial firms that showed widespread
42 1d at 308.
43 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2004) (prohibiting falsification of corporate records); 17
C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2004) (prohibiting officers and directors from making materially false
or misleading statements to accountants in connection with an audit or preparation of SEC
filings); see also Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the
Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Exchange Act
Release No. 15,570, 16 SEC Docket 1143, 1149 (Feb. 15, 1979).
44 Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the
Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Exchange Act
Release No. 15,570, 16 SEC Docket 1143, 1151 (Feb. 15, 1979).
4 5 Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Hearing on S 708
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and the Subcomm. on lnt'1 Fin. & Monetary Policy of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 82 (1981) (statement of Sen. John
H. Chafee, Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs). Senator Chafee
requested that an article, "No Wonder No Exports" by William Brock, U.S. Trade
Representative, which appeared in the Washington Post on May 20, 1981, be included in its
entirety in the hearing transcript. Id. at 81.
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dissatisfaction with the accounting provisions and, in particular, that "business
believes compliance is unreasonable without a materiality standard. '46 The
GAO recommended that the SEC provide business with further guidance. 47
The SEC provided assurances that enforcement would not be heavy-handed
and encouraged private sector initiatives to improve corporate accountability. 48
For example, in June 1980, the SEC withdrew two proposed rules that would
have required management to make a statement on internal accounting control
and would have required the company's auditor to report on the management's
statement. 49 While it stated that it was withdrawing the proposal in part because
of significant private sector initiatives, it also noted the substantial opposition to
the proposed rules because of concerns about government over-reaching. 50
Finally, in January 1981, Chairman Williams made a speech in which he
acknowledged the widespread anxiety about the accounting provisions that may
have resulted in "overly-burdensome compliance systems."51 Williams also
recognized "meaningful developments within the private sector ... in the area
of corporate accountability": independent directors, audit committees, internal
auditors, and the experience factor.52 Accordingly, he set forth an official
statement of SEC policy in which he emphasized that "reasonable business
decisions" would be afforded deference and that inadvertent mistakes would not
give rise to enforcement actions. 53 Moreover, a company should not "be
enjoined for a falsification of which its management, broadly defined, was not
46 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), AFMD-81-34, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS tit. p. (1981).
47 1d. at iii. It also recommended that Congress limit criminal penalties for violations of
the accounting provisions to "knowing and willful falsification of corporate books and
records." Id.
48 In its 1980 Annual Report, the SEC noted that it had "devoted a great deal of
study ... to comments by corporations and their auditors" about difficulties in complying
with the accounting provisions. 1980 SEC ANNUAL REPORT, at viii.4 9 See Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Exchange Act
Release No. 15,772, 17 SEC Docket 421, 421 (Apr. 30, 1979) (proposal) (withdrawn in
Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Exchange Act Release No.
16,877, 20 SEC Docket 310, 310 (June 6, 1980)). These were predecessors to the SOX
§ 404(a) and (b) requirements.
50 Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Exchange Act Release
No. 16,877, 20 SEC Docket 310, 310 11 (June 6, 1980).
51 See Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Accounting
Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Analysis 2 (Jan. 13, 1981), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/011381williams.pdf, see also Stephen J. Friedman,
Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act 1 (Feb. 25, 1981), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/022581
friedman.pdf (stating that controversy over accounting provisions was "a source of deep
concern" at the SEC).
52 Williams, supra note 51, at 19 20.
5 31d. at4.
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aware and reasonably should not have known." 54 The SEC described this
statement as an "unprecedented step" taken in response to the anxiety within the
business and professional communities. 55
2. Anti-Bribery Provision
The 1981 GAO survey also reported that the business community believed
that the anti-bribery prohibition was vague, ambiguous, and imposed a
16
competitive disadvantage on them. Although the GAO acknowledged that
DOJ had in place a procedure to obtain guidance, the GAO did not believe that
it effectively addressed the statute's ambiguities. Accordingly, it recommended
that DOJ and the SEC develop alternative ways to address them,5 7 advice that
was not followed.
In 1980, the SEC, for the first and only time, sought comments on the
impact and operation of the anti-bribery provision in order "to understand and
evaluate any questions or concerns which may have arisen since [the statute's]
enactment. '58 In the release it emphasized again that its interest in improper
corporate payments stemmed from concern about "weaknesses in the corporate
accountability mechanisms which undergird the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws." 59 With respect to the anti-bribery provision, it observed
that "it has been publicly reported that U.S. corporations are experiencing
difficulty in conducting their operations as a result of questions concerning the
applicability of the new antibribery prohibitions." 60 Because the SEC had no
empirical evidence concerning the law's impact on U.S. businesses, it issued the
release to obtain information. The SEC also invited comment on its policy that
it would not give advice concerning the applicability of the FCPA to particular
transactions. 6 1
The SEC received only fourteen comment letters. 62 This was, the SEC
decided, "too sparse to permit a fair and comprehensive analysis to be made at
this time with respect to the impact and operation of the bribery prohibitions." 63
The SEC also announced that, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, it would
5 4 Id. at3.
55 1980 SEC ANNUAL REPORT, at ix.
56 GAO, supra note 46, at i.
5 7 1d. at iii.
58 Impact of the Antibribery Prohibitions in Section 30A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 16,593, 19 SEC Docket 691, 691 (Feb. 21, 1980).5 9 1d. at 692.60 1d. at 693.
6 1 1d. at 694-95.
62Statement of Commission Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 17,099, 20 SEC Docket 1258, 1262 (Aug.
28, 1980).
6 3 1d. at 1263.
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take no enforcement action alleging violations of the anti-bribery provision if
the issuer had obtained assurances from DOJ that it would not take any
enforcement action. 64 Both the apparent lack of interest on the part of the
business community and the SEC's exercise of prosecutorial discretion may
reflect the fact that the SEC had brought only two enforcement actions to date. 65
3. The 1981 Hearing
In response to business concerns, the Senate Banking Committee held a
hearing to consider amending the FCPA, at which DOJ66 and GAO 67 testified in
support of consolidating enforcement of the anti-bribery provision in DOJ. The
SEC did not oppose the consolidation, stating that "[t]he [SEC]'s primary
mission is disclosure to investors, not substantive regulation of commercial
transactions." 68 The committee, in fact, did make this recommendation, 69 but
Congress did not act upon it.
D. The Quiet Years
After Chairman Williams stepped down in 1981, the SEC devoted little
attention to either the accounting or the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.70
Instead, Chairman John Shad7 ' focused on capital formation issues, 72 and the
Enforcement Division returned to core enforcement priorities and insider
64 1d at 1265. The SEC subsequently reaffirmed this policy. Statement of Commission
Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
Release No. 18,255, 23 SEC Docket 1457, 1458 (Nov. 12, 1981).
6 5 See Katy Industries, Litigation Release No. 8519, 1978 WL 207973 (Aug. 30, 1978);
Ralph M. Parsons Co., Litigation Release No. 8493, 1978 WL 207948 (Aug. 4, 1978).66 Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Hearing on S 708
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and the Subcomm. on lnt'1 Fin. & Monetary Policy of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 80 (1981) (statement of Edward C.
Schmutls, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
67 1d. at 136 (statements of Sen. John Heinz, Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs and Donald L. Scantlebury, Dir., Accounting & Fin. Mgmt. Div., Gen.
Accounting Office).
6 8 1d. at 278 (statement of John S. R. Shad, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n); see
also id. at 287 ("Section 30A has not been an important part of the [SEC]'s enforcement
authority.").6 9 S. REP.NO. 97-209, at 11 (1981).
70 See Marc i. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Administrative,
Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies Their Influence on Corporate
Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 174 (1982) (stating that after Williams'
tenure, the SEC retreated from corporate accountability issues).
71 John Shad was the SEC Chairman from May 6, 1981 until June 18, 1987. SEC,
Historical Summary, supra note 28.
72 Anne M. Khademian, The Securities and Exchange Commission: A Small Regulatory
Agency with a Gargantuan Challenge, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 515, 520 (2002).
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trading.73 SEC Commissioners and senior officials did not make major speeches
addressing any aspect of the FCPA. In fact, the only reference in a
Commissioner's speech during this period was a speech on June 9, 1983 by
John Evans, in which he described the anti-bribery provision as based on a
national policy unrelated to the objectives of the federal securities laws.74 The
Enforcement Division routinely brought actions for violations of the accounting
provisions, but only a very few of them involved alleged violations of the anti-
bribery provision.75 The SEC expressed only intermittent interest in
73 Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Vext Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 199 (1990).
74 John R. Evans, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Developments in the
Regulation of Accounting and Financial Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Acts 10-11
(June 9, 1983), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1983/O60983evans.pdf
(describing another proposed amendment to consolidate enforcement).
7 5 The SEC's Annual Report for fiscal year 1981 reports that the SEC brought five
injunctive actions under § 13(b)(2), one of which also alleged violations of anti-bribery
provisions. 1981 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 62. The Annual Report for fiscal year 1982 reports
that ten cases were brought under the accounting provisions of the FCPA. 1982 SEC
ANNUAL REPORT, at vi. The Annual Report for fiscal year 1983 reports twelve such actions.
1983 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 2. In fiscal year 1984, ten actions were brought to enforce the
accounting provisions of the FCPA; the Annual Report for fiscal year 1984 simply reports
that "[m]any cases concerning financial disclosure by reporting companies also involve
enforcement of the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." 1984 SEC
ANNUAL REPORT 3. From 1985 through 1997, Annual Reports contain language stating that
"[m]any of these [financial disclosure] cases also involve violations of the accounting
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." See, e.g., 1985 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 3. In
September 1998, an SEC attorney stated that, as of that date, the SEC had brought four
actions under the anti-bribery provision and over 300 actions under the accounting
provisions. Hearing on the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong. (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1998/tstyl 198.txt
(For the cases identified as FCPA actions, see Triton Energy Corp., Litigation Release No.
15,396, 1997 WL 348996 (June 26, 1997); Triton Energy Corp., Litigation Release No.
15,266, 1997 WL 94191 (Feb. 27, 1991); Ashland Oil, Inc., Litigation Release No. 11,150,
1986 WL 1166868 (July 8, 1986); Sam P. Wallace Co., Litigation Release No. 9414, 1981
WL 31107 (Aug. 13, 1981); and Katy Industries, Inc., Litigation Release No. 8519, 1978
WL 207973 (Aug. 30 1978)). My own research uncovered an additional six cases during that
time period that involved allegations of foreign bribery, although only violations of the
accounting provisions were alleged. See Montedison, Litigation Release No. 15,164, 1996
WL 673757 (Nov. 21, 1996); Bradley & Assoc., Inc., Litigation Release No. 29,270, 1991
WL 294262 (June 3, 1991); Tesoro Petroleum Corp., Litigation Release No. 9236, 1980 WL
21973 (Nov. 20, 1980); Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., Litigation Release No. 8815, 1979 WL
174272 (July 9, 1979); Ralph M. Parsons Co., Litigation Release No. 8493, 1978 WL
207948 (Aug. 4, 1978); Page Airways, Inc., Litigation Release No. 8372, 1978 WL 198184
(Apr. 13, 1978).
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strengthening corporate accountability and did not adopt any regulations or
make any major policy statements relating to corporate governance. 76
In 1983, the Senate Banking Committee again held a hearing that addressed
the consolidation of enforcement within DOJ.77 Like his predecessor, SEC
Chairman Shad testified that "[t]he [SEC]'s primary mission is disclosure, not
substantive regulation of commercial transactions. Therefore, repeal of section
30A or consolidation of that requirement within the Justice Department would
not impair the SEC's ability to administer the securities laws." 78
Once again, the Senate Committee recommended consolidation of
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions in DOJ; 79 once again, Congress took
no action. 80 Even though Congress amended other provisions of the FCPA in
198881 and again in 1998,82 it has not again seriously considered consolidation.
The 1998 amendments implemented a treaty that established international
standards governing foreign corrupt practices. 83 While there were predictions
76 The SEC did not propose any rules or issue any interpretive guidance until 1988,
when it returned to the issue of corporate accountability and proposed a rule, in response to
the Treadway Commission, that would require registrants to include a report of
management's responsibilities in their annual reports. Report of Management's
Responsibilities, Exchange Act Release No. 25,925, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,009 (July 26, 1988).
The SEC did not adopt this proposal, and corporate accountability appeared not to be on the
SEC agenda until 1991, when the SEC Annual Report described "[s]ignificant congressional
interest in management reports," including a bill (not enacted) that would have required an
SEC "study of registrants' compliance with the accounting and internal controls provisions."
1991 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 63.
7 7 Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Hearing on S. 708
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. & Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. (1983).
7 81d. at 49 (statement of John S. R. Shad, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n).
79 S. REP. No. 98-207, at 11 (1983).
80 Consolidation of the anti-bribery provision in DOJ was also proposed in 1986. See
Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing on S. 430 Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. & Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 63 (1986).
81 See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1415.
82 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3304, 3306.
83 The Annual Report for fiscal year 1990 reported that SEC staff participated in
discussions at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
regarding the establishment of international standards governing foreign corrupt practices.
1990 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 23. The Annual Report for fiscal year 1994 discussed the SEC's
participation, at the direction of Congress, in efforts of the OECD to address the issue of
illicit payments. 1994 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 26. The Annual Report for fiscal year 1996
reported that the SEC "contributed to international and U.S. government initiatives to battle
corruption and promote practical ways to combat bribery by publicly held companies." 1996
SEC ANNUAL REPORT 33. The SEC, with the Departments of State and Justice, also worked
with the OECD Working Group on Bribery to address foreign bribery through accounting
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by the time of the 1998 amendments that SEC enforcement might pick up,8 4 in
fact, the SEC brought no FCPA actions in fiscal year (FY) 1998, FY 1999, and
FY 2000.
III. THE ERA OF AGGRESSIVE SEC ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA
A. The SEC: FY2001 Through FY2006
Although the SEC did not signal any change in enforcement policy, 85 the
SEC began to enforce the FCPA in earnest in the early 2000s. Beginning with
FY 2001, the SEC instituted FCPA proceedings on a regular basis although,
through FY 2006, the number of actions in each year remained in the single
digits.86 The SEC began also to highlight selected FCPA actions in SEC Annual
Reports as significant enforcement actions. 87
The SEC also significantly increased monetary sanctions in FCPA cases. In
its settlement with ABB Ltd., in July 2004, the SEC employed, for the first time
in the FCPA context, the remedial tool that became the SEC's primary
remedy-disgorgement of illicit profits ($5.9 million).88 In addition, the $10.5
million penalty imposed was considerably larger than previous penalties,8 9
and auditing requirements. Id Finally, the Annual Report for fiscal year 1998 reported that
on November 10, 1998, President Clinton signed into law amendments to the FCPA that
implemented a treaty negotiated by OECD. 1998 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 87. The SEC had
testified in support of these changes. Id.
84 Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Expansion of SEC Authority into
Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 146
(1998).8 5 Harvey Pitt was the SEC Chairman from August 2001 until February 2003; William
Donaldson was the SEC Chairman from February 2003 until June 2005. SEC, Historical
Summary, supra note 28. Stephen Cutler was the SEC's Director of Enforcement from
October 2001 until April 2005. Enforcement Director Stephen M. Cutler to Leave
Commission, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-56.htm
(last modified Apr. 13, 2005). A search of the SEC website does not show that any of them
made any public statements about the FCPA during this period. See generally Speeches and
Public Statements, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech.shtml
(last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
8 6 See SEC FCPA ACTIONS DATABASE, supra note 8 (revealing the number of actions
each year from 2001 through 2006 as seven (FY 01), four (FY 02), four (FY 03), four (FY
04), seven (FY 05), and six (FY 06)).8 7 See, e.g., 2003 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 21 (discussing In re Am. Rice Inc.; SEC v.
Syncor Int'l Corp.); 2001 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 4-5 (discussing SEC v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp.).
88 SEC Sues ABB Ltd. in Foreign Bribery Case, Litigation Release No. 18,775, 2004
WL 1514888 (July 6, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Sues ABB Ltd. in Foreign Bribery Case].
8 9 Previously the largest civil penalty was $500,000. SEC Files Settled Enforcement
Action Against Schering-Plough Corporation for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations,
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although the significance of this is diminished by the fact that payment was
deemed satisfied by two affiliates' payment of criminal fines in parallel DOJ
proceedings, in part because of ABB's cooperation with the SEC staff
(including self-reporting). 90 Imposition of larger penalties was consistent with a
more aggressive enforcement policy generally at the SEC; beginning in 2003,
the SEC began levying larger penalties in corporate fraud cases. 91 A survey
reports, however, that FCPA cases settle for larger amounts than SEC
settlements overall in the post-SOX era.92
B. The Cox and Schapiro Years93
In FY 2007, under the tenure of Chairman Christopher Cox, the SEC not
only stepped up its enforcement of the FCPA, but also publicized its FCPA
actions, a trend that has continued under the tenure of SEC Chairman Mary
Schapiro. In each of the five most recent fiscal years, the SEC has brought
FCPA actions in the double-digits, 94 and an SEC press release in October 2008
described FCPA cases as a "growth" area. 95
Besides the increase in the number of cases, the size of the sanctions also
increased significantly, as SEC Enforcement Directors frequently boasted. 96 In
Litigation Release No. 18,740, 2004 WL 1268036 (June 9, 2004); SEC Obtains $500,000
Penalty Against Syncor International Corporation for Violating the Anti-Bribery Provisions
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Litigation Release No. 17,887, 2002 WL 31757645
(Dec. 10, 2002).
90 SEC Sues ABB Ltd. in Foreign Bribery Case, supra note 88.
91 Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission. A Critical Review of the
History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
367, 399 400 (2008); Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded
Investors?, 63 Bus. LAW. 317, 330-31 (2008).92 Max Gulker et al., SEC Settlement Trends: 2H]1 Update, NERA, 21 (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB SEC Trends 2H 01  2.pdf.
9 3 Christopher Cox was the SEC Chairman from August 2005 through January 2009,
and Mary L. Schapiro has been the SEC Chairman since January 2009. SEC, Historical
Summary, supra note 28.
94Chairman Cox stated that from January 2006 through November 2008, the SEC
brought thirty-eight foreign bribery cases. Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, The Importance of International Enforcement Cooperation in Today's Markets 4
(Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech /2008/spchllO7O8cc.htm. In
fact, he understated the number of cases: fourteen (FY 07); fifteen (FY 08); thirteen (FY 09);
sixteen (FY 10); and twenty (FY 11). See SEC FCPA ACTIONS DATABASE, supra note 8.9 5 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Fiscal 2008
Enforcement Results (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/
2008-254.htm. The SEC also highlighted FCPA actions as major enforcement cases in its
annual reports. E.g., 2008 SEC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPort 110; 2007 SEC
PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 91.
96 E.g., Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Remarks Before the Minority Corporate Counsel 2008 CLE Expo 5-6 (Mar. 27,
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December 2008, government officials, including SEC Enforcement Director
Linda Chatman Thomsen, called a news conference to announce a $1.6 billion
settlement among Siemens AG, the SEC, DOJ, and a number of other U.S. and
international law enforcement bodies.97 The SEC portion of the settlement-
$350 million in disgorgement-was by far the largest settlement amount
obtained by the SEC under the FCPA. 98
The Siemens settlement also marked the first time that U.S. and foreign
prosecutors had coordinated their enforcement efforts to address violations of
anti-bribery laws. 99 The fight against global corruption has become a favorite
talking point of the SEC and indeed appears to be the sole justification for the
SEC's aggressive enforcement. 100
In January 2009, President Obama named Mary L. Schapiro to chair the
SEC, and she assumed the responsibility of restoring the credibility of the SEC,
which had been humiliated by the Madoff scandal.'10 In order to enhance the
stature of the Enforcement Division, she recruited a new Director of
Enforcement, Robert Khuzami, with a strong background as a federal
prosecutor.10 2 Mr. Khuzami, in turn, recruited from outside the SEC two deputy
directors, perhaps to mark a break from the past and emphasize Enforcement's
new outlook. 10 3 One of Mr. Khuzami's first acts was to form five specialized
units within the Enforcement Division to handle complex cases, one of which,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spchO327081ct.htm ("Since
January 2006, the SEC has ordered the payment of more than $200 million in penalties,
disgorgement and prejudgment interest for FCPA violations.").
97 Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Statement at News Conference Announcing Siemens AG Settlement (Dec. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spchl2l5O8lct.htm.
9 81d. According to Ms. Thomsen, this was more than ten times the amount of the
previously largest settlement. Id.
9 9 1d.
100 See infra notes 103 04 and accompanying text.
10 1 Mary L. Schapiro, Message from the Chairman, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY
REP. 2 (2009).
102 Mr. Khuzami served for eleven years as a federal prosecutor in Manhattan, where he
was for three years Chief of its Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director of Enforcement
(Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-31 .htm. Before
joining the SEC, Mr. Khuzami was General Counsel for the Americas for Deutsche Bank
AG. Id.
103Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Lorin L. Reisner to Join SEC
Enforcement Division (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/
2009-150.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, George S. Canellos Named
Regional Director of SEC New York Regional Office (June 2, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-125.htm.
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the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act unit, would "focus on new and proactive
approaches to identifying violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.' 10 4
In November 2010, the SEC and DOJ conducted the first sweep of an
industrial sector (the oil services industry) to crack down on foreign payments
and obtained settlements with seven companies; the total sanctions paid to the
SEC amounted to $236.5 million. 10 5 In announcing the settlements, the SEC
made clear that coordinated law enforcement efforts against industry sectors
would continue. 10 6
Remarkably, at no time have these SEC Chairmen or Enforcement
Directors offered a convincing explanation of how the enforcement of the anti-
bribery provision fits within the SEC's mission. 10 7 In discussing the increased
efforts, Chairman Cox related it vaguely to two of his themes-enforcement as
the SEC's top priority and the importance of international cooperation in an era
of global securities markets. 108 Chairman Schapiro asserted a connection thusly:
"Corrupt business practices hurt companies, developing markets and ultimately
investors." 10 9 Enforcement Director Thomsen described the FCPA actions as
"help[ing] to combat bribery and public corruption in countries all around the
globe," 110 without, however, tying that purpose to the SEC's mission. In a
speech assessing the first one hundred days of his tenure, Mr. Khuzami
emphasized that there had been a "reinvigoration of our core mission of investor
protection." 1 In the same speech, speaking about the new FCPA unit, he stated
104 Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks
Before the New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement 4 (Aug. 5,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO8O5O9rk.htm.
10 5 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and
Freight Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm [hereinafter SEC Press
Release].106 Id.
10 7 The SEC's stepped-up campaign to enforce a complex statute, without first
developing normative standards of conduct through rulemaking or interpretive guidance,
may not constitute best practices for the SEC. Pitt & Schapiro, supra note 73, at 167.
10 8 Cox, supra note 94.
109 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the National
Conference of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals 2 (July 9,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spchO7O9lOmls.htm. In a
September 23, 2011 letter to Senator Mike Crapo, Ms. Schapiro gave an additional reason:
the SEC's FCPA enforcement program "incentivizes companies to self-assess and update
their compliance and internal controls all of which benefits companies' operations overall
and provides greater transparency to investors." Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to the Honorable Mike Crapo, U.S. Senator (Sept. 23, 2011) (on
file with author).
I 10 Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
It's Always Something 6 (June 4, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/
spch0604081ct.htm.
I IIKhuzami, supra note 104.
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that "[w]hile we have been active in this area, more needs to be done, including
being more proactive in investigations, working more closely with our foreign
counterparts, and taking a more global approach to these violations."] 12 Mr.
Khuzami, however, stated no connection between the SEC's mission and
enforcement of the anti-bribery provision, despite the fact that he articulated as
a first principle the need "to be as strategic as possible" and, as a third principle,
to be "as smart as possible [because the SEC's] resources are finite and
critically limited." 113 Moreover, his list of enforcement priorities did not
specifically include FCPA actions. 114
In addition, apart from the fact that the SEC issues press releases
announcing every FCPA settlement, there has been little discussion by other
Commissioners or in SEC reports about FCPA actions and how these actions
relate to the SEC's mission. The little commentary there is focuses on the value
of coordinated international efforts to combat bribery 115 and raising the SEC's
profile on the global stage. 116
Instead, the SEC's message is to emphasize the number of actions and the
amount of the sanctions and to project an image of a tough law enforcement
official. While the message may serve a deterrent effect, another purpose may
well be to boost the reputation of the SEC. 117 The Siemens settlement for
example, was announced just a few days after the revelation of the Madoff
fraud called into doubt the SEC's ability to police the securities markets. 118 In
emphasizing in her remarks the "unsavory story" and the "intricate scheme," 119
Ms. Thomsen may well have wanted to communicate the message: see, we can
track down bad guys and make them pay. Similarly, in the press release
1121d.
113 Id
114 Enforcement actions relating to the credit crisis had the highest priority, followed by
Ponzi schemes, cross-market misconduct, and a broad category denominated "traditional
bread-and-butter priorities" that included accounting and financial statement fraud. Id
115 E.g., Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor Protection
Laws: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 11 1th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2009) (statement of
Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/2009/ts032009ebw.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, OECD
Commends U.S. Regulators for Efforts to Fight Transnational Bribery (Oct. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-200.htm; see also 2010 SEC
PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 157 (referring to extensive cooperation with
federal and foreign law enforcement agencies and regulators to bring wrongdoers to justice).
116 Cheryl J. Scarboro, Chief of the FCPA Unit, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at
News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division 4 (Jan. 13,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0 11310newsconf.htm
(speaking about raising the SEC's profile on the global stage).
ll 7 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1591, 1620 (2006) (using insider
trading cases as an example of how enforcement is a way to reach out for public support).
118 See supra notes 97 99 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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announcing the settlements in the oil services industry, Mr. Khuzami
communicated a strong message of cracking down on corporate wrongdoing:
Bribing customs officials is not only illegal but also bad for business, as the
coordinated efforts of law enforcement increase the risk of detection every
day.... These companies resorted to lucrative arrangements behind the scenes
to obtain phony paperwork and special favors, and they landed themselves
squarely in investigators' crosshairs. 120
IV. A CALL TO RETURN TO THE SEC's INVESTOR PROTECTION MISSION
There is extensive academic literature offering theories on what is wrong
with agencies in general and the SEC in particular. Public choice theory is the
foundation of much critical analysis of how agencies operate. Public choice
theory explains that government officials are motivated by self-interest and
pursue agendas that advance their interests without regard to the public good. 12 1
Administrative agencies act to expand their power and influence, frequently by
aligning with the industry they are regulating, and seek opportunities for
lucrative post-government employment.' 22 Professor Jonathan Macey, for
example, has applied public choice theory to argue that the SEC exhibits
symptoms of agency obsolescence that may aggravate agency imperialism,
"turf-grabbing," and capture by special interest groups. 12 3 More recently,
psychological theory has been used to explain agencies' poor policy choices.
Cognitive errors on the part of government officials can lead to overconfidence
and a narrow focus on their mission.1 24 Professors Stephen Choi and Adam
Pritchard argue that, because of cognitive biases, the SEC should have to
overcome a presumption against regulation and demonstrate a high likelihood
120 SEC Press Release, supra note 105.
121 For descriptions of public choice theory and relevant sources, see Steven P. Croley,
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
34-41 (1998); and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia A. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 563-71 (2002).
122 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 121, at 567-68.
123 Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 921 23 (1994); see
also Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the
National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 321 24 (explaining, using public choice
theory, the SEC's failure to pursue a national market system). See generally David D.
Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand. A Private Interest Model, with an
Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J. L. & ECON. 311 (1987) (using public choice
theory to criticize insider trading regulation).
124 See generally Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 121; Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive
Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 486 (2002).
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of net benefits from new regulation. 125 Finally, organization theory asserts that
internal institutional biases cause agency dysfunction, which causes the agency
to displace public interest goals with self-serving institutional goals. Professor
Donald Langevoort has used this theory to explore the SEC's use of rhetorical
conventions in molding agency behavior.126
Do any of these theories provide any explanatory power with regard to the
history of the SEC's use of its enforcement powers under the FCPA? Contrary
to public choice theory, the SEC did not seek out or welcome the opportunity to
expand its power to enforce the anti-bribery provision. 127 To the contrary, as I
have recounted, the SEC consistently asserted that it was not part of its
mission. 128 On the other hand, the SEC's recent, unexplained aggressive
enforcement fits with the theory that a failing agency may take efforts to
reassert its importance. 129 Similarly, the psychological theory does not provide
an unequivocal explanation, although its emphasis on overconfidence may
explain the contradiction between the SEC's recent aggressive enforcement and
its inability to see that bribery is not part of its mission. 130 Similarly,
organization theory's emphasis on agency dysfunction from within may help
explain why the agency took up a campaign against global corruption at a time
when it was perceived as failing at its investor protection mission, although the
SEC's abbreviated discussion of its relationship to its mission discounts the
significance of rhetoric. 13 1 Ultimately, however, none of these theories provide
much explanatory power for the SEC's recent aggressive campaign to enforce
the FCPA. 132 We are left with the fact that, for unexplained reasons, the SEC
determined to make an about-face.
Is it unfair to fault the SEC for enforcing the FCPA? Even if enforcement of
the FCPA detracts from the SEC's investor protection mission, it can be argued
that it is simply an unavoidable cost to carry out the congressional mandate of
fighting against overseas bribery. Congress, after all, tasked the SEC with that
responsibility; if the SEC did not enforce the FCPA, it would arguably be
shirking its statutory responsibilities.
The SEC is not unique in possessing multiple, even conflicting goals;
indeed, multiple-goal agencies have been identified as a fundamental problem
12 5 See generally Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
126 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice,
Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527
(1990) (explaining the theory and applying it to SEC policy decisions).
12 7 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
12 8 See supra notes 20-21, 66, 76 and accompanying text.
12 9 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132 See generally Langevoort, supra note 126 (discussing how theories do not provide
convincing explanations of agency behavior).
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in developing an effective regulatory system. 133 Economic and political science
literature forecasts that multiple-goal agencies will devote too many resources
on responsibilities that are easier to measure and have higher incentives and will
devote too little attention on responsibilities that are harder to measure and have
lower incentives. 134 The SEC's decision to ramp up FCPA enforcement in
recent years may be consistent with this prediction: both the SEC and the
enforcement attorneys may derive greater benefits (publicity, sense of
accomplishment, and, for the attorneys, future job prospects) from big-dollar
FCPA settlements against multinational corporations than they do from bringing
enforcement actions to deter and punish more mundane types of fraud that do
not grab headlines. Accordingly, one can question whether an agency with
multiple goals, like the SEC, allocates its resources to best serve the public
welfare.
Unfortunately, we lack empirical studies on the effectiveness of the SEC,
but there is a consensus among academics, policy makers, and the media that, at
least since the turn of the century, the SEC's "glory days" are behind it. 135 In
the past decade, it has been slow to detect securities fraud and corruption. 136
Many question why the SEC has not brought more actions against financial
services firms and their executives who brought the world's economy to the
brink of collapse. 137 Strikingly, the SEC's diminished reputation as an effective
enforcer of the federal securities laws coincided with its stepped up enforcement
of the FCPA. While these developments are not necessarily correlated, they
suggest that stepped-up FCPA enforcement has distracted the SEC from its
mission.
Scholars of the SEC have tied the SEC's effectiveness to its clearly defined
mission: "to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation." 138 According to Joel Seligman,139 "[t]he broader an
133 Eric Biber, Too V/any Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfimctions of Multiple-
GoalAgencies, 33 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2008).
13 41d. at 9.
135Eg., Jonathan G. Katz, Reviewing the SEC, Reinvigorating the SEC, 71 U. PITT. L.
REV. 489, 496 (2010) (stating there is a "strong consensus" that the SEC in recent years has
failed to perform satisfactorily); Langevoort, supra note 117, at 1608 (stating that many see
the "golden age" of the SEC from the early 1960s through either the 1970s or 1980s).
136 For example, the SEC did not detect the Enron/Worldcom financial fraud, the mutual
funds and analysts' conflicts, the Madoff scandal, or the current financial crisis.
137 See, e.g., Ben Hallman, SEC Enforcement Chief Defends Record Under Fire From
Rakoff Critics, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2012, 9:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/01/18/sec-mounts-defense-of-enforcement n 1205318.html (describing criticism
that the SEC is not doing enough to hold executives accountable for fraud).
138 SEC, supra note 7; see also James D. Cox, Reinventing the SEC by Staring into Its
Past, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 459, 461 (2009) (pointing to its apolitical mission as a reason for the
SEC's durability).
13 9 Joel Seligman is the foremost historian of the SEC and author of THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 10.
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agency's jurisdiction, the more likely it is to lack resources or focus to address
appropriate priorities." '' H The literature on administrative agencies, moreover,
supports the importance of a clearly defined mission to an agency's
effectiveness. A central, clearly defined mission allows an agency to develop
expertise. 14 1 It may reduce the likelihood of conflicting responsibilities. 142 It
also guards against the danger of "spreading itself too thin" or the misallocation
of scarce resources. 14 3
With respect to expertise: since Congress first considered enactment of the
FCPA, the SEC has consistently stated that the statute presented "a broad issue
of national policy with important implications for international trade and
commerce" 14 4 which was outside the scope of the SEC's expertise. It has never
subsequently convincingly explained how enforcement of the FCPA fits within
the SEC's mission. 14 5 With respect to conflicting responsibilities: protecting
investors was, at least until recently, seen as an apolitical agenda that everyone
could agree on.14 6 Although obtaining large penalties against large multi-
national corporations may win the SEC support by playing to populist distrust,
others view regulating overseas bribery activities as moralistic and anti-
competitive. 147 Moreover, if SEC staff does not view the FCPA as part of its
140 Joel Seligman, Tyrell Williams Lecture, Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for
Independent Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2011). Current and former
SEC Commissioners have contributed to the literature on the SEC's mission from a
deregulatory perspective. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 91, at 367; Troy A. Paredes, On
the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and
Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1004, 1018; Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 73, at 149.
141 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 19 (2010) (explaining that the need for expertise is classic
explanation for creating independent agencies); see also Cox, supra note 138, at 463 65
(describing SEC studies of industry practices that led to important reforms).
142 Stevenson, supra note 23, at 72 (raising the concern that enforcing the FCPA makes
the SEC "ever more schizophrenic"). The SEC's tripartite mission does present the classic
conflict between advancing industry goals versus the public interest. For example, SEC staff
recently defended its grant of various waivers to securities laws violators because of its
statutory mandate to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets and facilitate capital
formation. Meredith Cross, et al., Letter to the Editor, The View From the S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/opinion/the-
view-from-the sec.html? r- 1 &sq-meredith cross sec&st-cse&scp-2&pagewanted-print.
143 Seligman, supra note 140.
144 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
145 See generally supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
146 See Cox, supra note 138.
147See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 282-85 (1997) (arguing that
the FCPA is officious and insensitive to cultural differences but rejecting the argument of
competitive disadvantage).
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mission, it may reflect adversely on the esprit de corps.14 8 I concede, however,
that these arguments with respect to expertise and conflicting responsibilities
are theoretical and speculative.
With respect to allocation of resources, we are dealing with reality. The
SEC has consistently, and with good reason, asserted that it has inadequate
resources to address all the increased demands placed upon it, particularly by
growth in the securities industry and by Dodd-Frank. 149 Scarcity of resources is
a perennial problem for the SEC that will not change. In recent years,
congressional approval of the SEC's budget has been an extended, contentious
process, reflecting, at times, varying views of the SEC's competence and the
politics of government budgeting that has engendered considerable uncertainty
about the SEC's level of funding. 150 Apart from the vagaries of the budgeting
process, the reality is that federal agencies function in a world where resources
are always scarce and priorities must be made.
Of course we cannot know if the SEC would do a better job of protecting
investors if resources were not diverted from its investor protection mission.
The fact remains, however, that there is little countervailing public interest in
SEC enforcement of the FCPA because Congress could consolidate
enforcement of the FCPA within DOJ. It seems unlikely that consolidation
would significantly weaken the congressional mandate of fighting against
overseas bribery since DOJ already has established expertise in criminal
enforcement of the statute. 15 1
Although I conclude that the best solution is to consolidate enforcement of
the anti-bribery provision in DOJ, some administrative law scholars do identify
policy justifications for the sharing of jurisdiction among agencies. The
principal advantages of redundant regulation are said to be the potential to
14 8 See Langevoort, supra note 117, at 1611-12 (suggesting that the institutional
commitment to investor protection may have weakened). Khuzami's creation of a
specialized (elite) unit, the attention given to large FCPA settlements, and the training
provided for lucrative post-SEC careers are all consistent with public choice theory. See
generally supra note 121.
149See, e.g., SEC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2010-2015, at 6-7 (2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan 1015 f.pdf.
150 In fact, the SEC's budget does not impact the government's overall budget, because
it is funded from industry fees. If the budget approved by Congress is less than the fees, the
SEC must reduce its fees. Exchange Act § 31, 15 U.S.C. § 78ee (2006). Chairman Schapiro
argued, without success, for self-funding during congressional deliberations leading up to
Dodd-Frank. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement
Concerning Agency Self-Funding 1-3 (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2010/spch04151Omls.htm.
151 See Stevenson, supra note 23, at 71, and accompanying text. One of the reasons
Congress gave the SEC FCPA enforcement power was because the SEC had already
developed expertise. See id
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harness expertise and competencies of specialized agencies. 152 More
specifically, redundancy can improve regulation by creating competition among
agencies, developing collective expertise, and providing insurance against one
agency's shortcomings. 15 3 It is debatable, however, the extent to which these
potential benefits are ever realized. Has shared DOJ and SEC enforcement
accomplished more than DOJ could do on its own, and, if so, at what cost, in
terms of diminishment of the SEC's investor protection mission? We simply do
not know. Against these potential benefits, multiple goals may cause agencies to
lose their sense of mission. 154
Congressional committees have previously recognized that it would make
sense to consolidate both criminal and civil enforcement within DOJ.1 55 More
recently, consolidation of agencies has become a talking point both in the
Executive Branch and Congress. President Obama recently asked for authority
to propose mergers of agencies, which Congress would then have to approve or
reject. 156 Congress previously adopted a policy to "eliminate overlapping and
duplication of effort" among agencies 157 and instructed the GAO to make
recommendations for consolidation. 158 There does not appear to be any
downside to consolidation, because DOJ has the experience, expertise, and
global perspective to enforce the anti-bribery provision.
Academic literature worries about "agency creep," self-aggrandizing efforts
to expand agency jurisdiction and power. 159 The history of the FCPA, however,
is an example of another problem. Congress gave the SEC power that it did not
want, that is not part of its central mission, and that puts a strain on its
152 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012).
15 3 Id. at 1151; see also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SuP. CT. REV. 201, 211 16 (explaining overlapping and
underlapping jurisdiction as partial response to agency problems).154 See supra notes 140-14242 and accompanying text.
155 See supra Parts II.C.3, II.D, and note 80. Some academics have called for the transfer
of all the SEC's enforcement powers to DOJ. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Should the SEC
Spin Off the Enforcement Division?, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. OF Bus. L. 121, 130 33
(2009); A. C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1073, 1096-97 (2005). My proposal is more modest.
156 Mark Landler & Annie Lowrey, Obama Bid to Cut the Government Tests Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2012, at A1.
1575 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006).
158Public Debt Limit Increase, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 8, 29 30 (codified
at 31 U.S.C. § 712 (2010)). The GAO has issued two reports identifying areas of potential
duplication. See generally U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-342SP, 2012
ANNUAL REPORT: OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE DUPLICATION, OVERLAP AND
FRAGMENTATION, ACHIEVE SAVINGS, AND ENHANCE REVENUE (Feb. 28, 2012); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE POTENTIAL
DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE REVENUE
(Mar. 1, 2011).
15 9 See generally supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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resources. 160 Although for many years it made the choice not to exercise
vigorously this power, the SEC in the recent years has, without explanation,
reversed its course.
Finally, it's "d~jdi vu all over again." In Dodd-Frank, Congress could not
resist giving the SEC additional powers that are outside its investor protection
mission. Dodd-Frank § 1502 requires reporting companies to disclose whether
they manufacture products using "conflict minerals" sourced from the
Democratic Republic of Congo or contiguous countries and tasks the SEC with
promulgating rules to implement the provision. 16 1 SEC Chairman Schapiro
freely admitted that the subject matter is outside the SEC's expertise. 162 To
date, the SEC has expended countless hours in drafting regulations, which met
with substantial criticism from industry and human rights groups alike. 163 No
good can come of this.
The SEC is the federal agency charged with the responsibility of protecting
investors. Unfortunately, since securities fraud shows no sign of abating, the
need for protecting investors only continues to grow. The SEC needs to return
to its original purpose: investor protection.
160 See generally Langevoort, supra note 126 (explaining why theories on how and why
agencies regulate are unconvincing because of different circumstances).
161 See Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation, 3 HARV.
Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 109 10 (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/01 /Taylor-Conflict-Minerals.pdf (criticizing the proposed rules).
162 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Specialized Disclosure of
Use of Conflict Minerals Under Dodd-Frank Act (Dec. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-245.htm.
163 See David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Grapples with Writing 'Conflict Minerals' Rules for
Firms, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/sec-struggles-to-write-conflict-minerals-regulations-forcompanies/20 11/
10/18/gIQAvZqfvLstory.html. Oxfam America sued the SEC to force completion of the
regulations, which Congress contemplated would be issued within 270 days after the
statute's effective date. Ben Gemen, Oxfam sues SEC to force completion of Dodd-Frank oil
transparency rule, THE HILL (May 16, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-
wire/e2-wire/227731-oxfam-sues-sec-to-force-oil-transparency-rule. The SEC issued the
final rules on August 22, 2012. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, 77
Fed. Reg. 56274 (Sept. 12, 2012).
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